Croughtonwatch:

• Main index

Latest events/news

General info.:

What is USAF Croughton for?

What does USAF Croughton do?

News & Technical Reports on USAF Croughton/JIAC

Videos

USAF Croughton & Networked Warfare – The Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex:

The Development

The USAF Croughton Site

The Communications Centre

Intelligence Fusion

Information Warfare

On-line Resources

Site information:
USAF Croughton
USAF Barford St. John

Circular Walks:
USAF Croughton
USAF Barford St.John

FRAW main index  

title image
The NATO Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex:

The Command & Communications Centre

The command complex at USAF Croughton is on the northern edge of the site (see picture above, or the larger panorama below). Due to the topography of the site it is difficult to see from the main gate. The best view is from the public footpath at the top of the hill on the other side of the valley, near Gateridge Farm.

The administration activities of the 422nd Air Base Group are managed at various buildings within the larger secure perimeter of the site.

USAF Croughton C2 centre plan The Command and Communications Centre (in the centre of the picture at the top of the page, and panorama below) are a site-within-the-site, with their own additional secure compound, security and guards. This is where the operational activities of the site are carried out. Decisions are not made here. Instead this site manages the communications infrastructure required to support military and intelligence operations.

Croughton is known to be involved in the management of drone operations in the Middle East and North Africa. The extent of this, in particular its links to the drone programme in Yemen, and the maintenance of the infrastructure by civil companies such as BT, was revealed as part of an investigation by Computer Weekly. It has been also implicated in the surveillance of ‘friendly’ states – such as the hacking of Chancellor Merkel’s mobile phone.

To the west of the command centre, at the foot of the communications mast, is the communications centre. This is a computer data centre that manages the information flowing in and out of the site via the extensive fibre-optic cable links, and the two SATCOM sites.

Panorama over the Command & Communications centre from the north


move slider at bottom to scroll across the panorama


Communications links

The most obvious feature of the USAF Croughton are the four large radomes near the middle of the site, along with a handful of unsheltered satellite dishes scattered elsewhere.

Some call radomes, golf balls. In terms of the reality of modern communications, it would be more appropriate to call them puffballs. That’s because, like fungi, though the ‘ball’ is the most visible part of the system, much of the activity within the organism happens below ground – via the mycelial fibres that fan out great distances from the puffball.

croughton western SATCOM site While satellite communications are the most visible feature at military communications sites, the reality today is that most military and intelligence data is shifted via optical cable.

Satellite communications are essential for mobile weapons and military forces. For fixed sites it is cables that are the most significant data links. Satellite links between fixed sites are usually only used when the cable network is not available.

The management of these links is controlled by the Defense Information Technology Contracting Organization Europe (DITCO). This is a division of the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA).

It is DISA who provide the communications between US military and intelligence sites across the globe. Increasingly this network is not maintained by the military themselves. It is routinely contracted-out to civilian operators (e.g. BT or Cable & Wireless). The US military also routinely contracts with satellite operators for mobile links too (such as INMARSAT).

However, while DISA maintains a dedicated communications network that spans the globe, across that network it connects at multiple points to the civil telecommunications network and the Internet. This gives the military the ability to piggy-back across public data networks (using encrypted ‘virtual networks’) whenever they require extra operational capacity.


Military data communications links serving USAF Croughton

usaf croughton uk comms links
Note: The diagram only includes links commissioned by the US military under Congress-controlled military budget – which are openly tendered for. It does not include links created for intelligence agencies which are controlled under a separate, secret, commissioning process.

usaf croughton european comms links
Note: This diagram is based on a slide depicting the SIPRNet/NIPRNet networks in the early 2000s. It is likely to have been modified since as part of evolving US military operations in the region.


Networking and automating conflict

Out of the failed ‘Star Wars’ project of the 1980s, the US military began to view ‘information’ as a weapon of war. This began with the 1990s policy of Full Spectrum Dominance – defined as:

The cumulative effect of dominance in the air, land, maritime, and space domains, electromagnetic spectrum, and information environment (which includes cyberspace) that permits the conduct of joint operations without effective opposition or prohibitive interference.

From this policy we get new projects and tactics related to electronic warfare, and the co-ordination of military operations using improved communications links. The ultimate creation of this policy was the concept of Network Centric Warfare (see next subsection).

military intelligence room
SIPRNet – Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (Department of Defense);
GWAN – Government Wide Area Network (National Reconnaissance Office);
NSANet – National Security Agency Network (inc. Five Eyes);
JWICS – Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (DIA);
Site operations information – top secret (TS), sensitive information (SI), talent keyhole (TK).

In the 2000s, with the development of the Internet as a major part of economic and industrial organisation of Western society, the military began to consider cyberspace as a new theatre of operations.

This led first to the inclusion of cyber operations within each branch of the military and special forces. Then, in May 2018, to the creation of the new US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) – which provides an independent, global tactical offensive capability for global US cyber operations.

This change in emphasis was outlined in the US European Command’s recent (2018) Posture Statement, which notes:

C4ISR is a fundamental capability set for the Global Operating Model… USEUCOM’s command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) networks must also become more resilient and survivable. More work is needed to ensure the sustainment of operations and to maintain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace. We are working with the Services to develop infrastructure that will significantly increase C4I capability and resilience...

USEUCOM is expanding its cyber capabilities and integrating cyber operations into full-spectrum military activities. USEUCOM is focused on refining cyberspace information sharing tactics, techniques and procedures. To ensure wartime interoperability, USEUCOM is engaged with NATO Allies’ and partners’ logistics and cyberspace experts to develop a shared framework for cyber security.

The creation of US Cyber Command will lead to a gradual change in the role of sites such as USAF Croughton. More generally though, as Western military forces seek to use technology and automation to project power, the role of sites such as USAF Croughton will become one of the most critical parts of projecting power around the world.

croughton present comms capacity
USAF Croughton – present-day communications capacity


Network Centric Warfare

Network Centric Warfare is a theory that has been emerging since the 1980s, alongside the wider use of computers and telemetry by military forces. It focusses on the role that greater information, connectedness and awareness has on military forces – enabling them to become more specialist, smaller and more mobile, and allowing the greater use of automated/self-guided technology.

There have been whole tomes written on this issue, but it can be summed up as consisting of:

This system is aimed at delivering 'information superiority', as a pre-requisite of physical battlefield superiority in the theatre of operations.

With a persistent view of events, and time-critical response, any and all opportunities for action can be responded to. The aim is not simply to respond to acts of aggression after the event, as was the case previously. The goal is to dominate the space, pre-emptively, so that no one is able to act against the interests of the military force.

Of course the ideal situation is that this persistent view of events is not just within currently active conflicts. Ideally the network, and thus the persistence of surveillance, must cover every part of the surface of the world.

To ameliorate the negative connotations of the idea of ‘dominating’ an area, or deploying mass surveillance over everything and everyone, the actions involved are often encoded in various combinations of jargon acronyms:


croughton present comms capacity
USAF Croughton – future communications capacity, after JIAC construction


Next section » The NATO Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex – Intelligence Fusion